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Abstract: This paper defines the problem of Scalable Secure Computing in a Social network:
we call it the S3 problem. In short, nodes, directly reflecting on associated users, need to compute
a function f : V → U of their inputs in a set of constant size, in a scalable and secure way.
Scalability means that the message and computational complexity of the distributed computation
is at most O(√n · polylog n), which forbids asymmetric cryptography. Security encompasses (1)
accuracy and (2) privacy: accuracy holds when the distance from the output to the ideal result
is negligible with respect to the maximum distance between any two possible results; privacy is
characterized by how the information disclosed by the computation helps faulty nodes infer inputs
of non-faulty nodes.
We present AG-S3, a protocol that S3-computes a class of aggregation functions, that is that
can be expressed as a commutative monoid operation on U : f(x1, . . . , xn) = x1⊕· · ·⊕xn, assuming
the number of faulty participants is at most
√
n/ log2 n. Key to our protocol is a dedicated overlay
structure that enables secret sharing and distributed verifications which leverage the social aspect
of the network: nodes care about their reputation and do not want to be tagged as misbehaving.
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1 Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an explosion of online social networks and the number of users
of such networks is still growing regularly by the day, e.g. Facebook boasts by now more than 400
millions users. These networks constitute huge live platforms that are exploited in many ways,
from conducting polls about political tendencies to gathering thousands of students around an
evening drink. It is clearly appealing to perform large-scale general purpose computations on such
platforms and one might be tempted to use a central authority for that, namely one provided by
the company orchestrating the social network. Yet, this poses several privacy problems, besides
scalability. For instance, there is no guarantee that Facebook will not make any commercial usage
of the personal information of its users. In 2009, Facebook tried to change its privacy policy to
impose new terms of use, granting the company a perpetual ownership of personal contents –
even if the users decide to delete their account. The new policy was not adopted eventually, but
highlighted the eagerness of such companies to use personal and sensitive information.
We argue for a decentralized approach where the participants in the social network keep their
own data and perform computations in a distributed fashion without any central authority. A
natural question that arises then is what distributed computations can be performed in such a
decentralized setting. Our primary contribution is to lay the ground for precisely expressing the
question. We refer to the underlying problem as the S3 problem: Scalable Secure Computing in
a Social network. Whereas scalability characterizes the message and computational complexity of
the computation, the secure aspect of S3 encompasses accuracy and privacy. Accuracy refers to the
robustness of the computation and aims at ensuring accurate results in the presence of dishonest
participants. This is crucial in a distributed scheme where dishonest participants might, besides
disrupting their own input, also disrupt any intermediary result for which they are responsible.
The main challenge is to limit the amount of bias caused by dishonest participants. Privacy
is characterized by the amount of information on the inputs disclosed to other nodes by the
computation. Intuitively, achieving all three requirements seem impossible. Clearly, tolerating
dishonest players and ensuring privacy calls for cryptographic primitives. Yet, cryptographic
schemes, typically used for multi-party computations, involve too high a computation overhead
and rely on higher mathematics and the intractability of certain computations [3,12,16]. Instead,
we leverage users’ concern for reputation using a information theoretical approach and alleviate
the need for cryptographic primitives. A characteristic of the social network context is indeed that
the nodes are in fact users who might not want to reveal their input, nor expose any misbehavior.
This reputation concern determines the extent to which dishonest nodes act: up to the point that
their misbehavior remains discrete enough not to be discovered.
Solving the S3 problem is challenging, despite leveraging this reputation concern: to ensure
privacy, an algorithm must ensure that even when all the nodes except one have the same inputs,
the information obtained by the coalition of faulty nodes cannot know which non-faulty node had
a different input. This requires the existence of two configurations of inputs that differ for two
nodes, which with high probability lead to the same sequence of messages received by the faulty
nodes. In turn, this boils down to swapping two nodes’ inputs transparently (from the standpoint
of the faulty nodes), which is challenging when the protocol needs to be also scalable and accurate.
The scalability requirement (i.e., each node communicates with a limited number of nodes) makes
it difficult to find a chain of messages that can be swapped transparently between two nodes in the
system. The trade-off between privacy and accuracy can be illustrated by the following paradox:
on the one hand verifying that nodes do not corrupt the messages they receive (without digital
signature) requires the verifier to gather some information about what the verified node received;
on the other hand the more the nodes know about the messages exchanged the more the privacy
of the nodes is compromised.
Our contributions are twofold. Firstly, we define the Scalable Secure Computing problem in
a Social network, namely the S3 problem. Secondly, we present a distributed protocol, we call
AG-S3 (i.e., S3 for AGgregation), that solves the problem for a class of aggregation functions that
derive from a monoid operation on U : f(x1, ..., xn) = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn, under the assumption that
the number of faulty nodes is upper-bounded by
√
n/ log2 n. At the core of our protocol lie (1) a
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structured overlay where nodes are clustered into groups, (2) a secret sharing scheme that allows
the nodes to obfuscate their inputs, and (3) a verification procedure which potentially tags the
profiles of suspected nodes. Beyond these contributions, our paper can be viewed as a first step
toward characterizing what can be computed in a large scale social network while accounting for
the human nature of its users.
2 Problem statement
This section defines the problem of Scalable Secure Computing in a Social network : the S3 prob-
lem. The problem involves a S3 candidate, namely the function to be computed, and a set of
nodes Π = {p1, . . . , pn}.
2.1 Candidates
Definition 1 (S3 candidate). A S3 candidate is a quadruple (f, V, U, d), where V is an arbitrary
set, f is a function f : V ∗ → U such that f(v1, . . . , vn) = f(vσ(1), . . . , vσ(n)) for any permutation
σ of the inputs, and (U, d) is a metric space.
Each node in Π has an input value in the set V , and a S3 candidate maps the inputs of the nodes
to a value in a metric space. The function f is assumed to be symmetric in the sense that the output
depends on the multiset of inputs but not on their assignation to nodes. For example, a binary poll
over Π can be modeled by the S3 candidate ((v1, v2, . . . , vn) 7→ v1+· · ·+vn, {−1,+1},Z, (z1, z2) 7→
|z1 − z2|). Consider also a component-wise addition on U = Zd, where V is the set of all vectors
with exactly one nonzero component, which is either +1 or −1. The distance function is then just
the L1 (or Manhattan distance).
The nodes considered in the S3 problem are users of a social network, able to (1) communicate
with private message passing and (2) tag the public profile of each other. As such, every node
directly reflects on the associated user. Nodes care about their privacy and their reputation: a
user wants neither the private information contained in her input, nor her misbehavior, if any, to
be disclosed. This reputation concern is crucial to make the problem tractable. To ensure security,
part of the computation consists in checking the correctness of other nodes’ behavior. The output
of a node p is a value in U plus a set Fp of nodes that p detected as faulty. This information is
eventually reported on the public profile of the involved nodes by means of tags of the form “p
detected nodes in Fp as faulty”.
Faulty nodes are considered rational: their goal is only to bias the output of the computation
and infer the inputs of the users taking part in the computation. As such, their behavior is more
restricted than that of Byzantine users [11]. To achieve their goal, faulty nodes may collude.
In our context, a distributed computation D on the set of nodes Π, is a sequence of message
exchanges and local computations such that any non-faulty node p eventually outputs a value op.
The content of the message and the nodes’ outputs are random variables whose value is determined
by the random choices made by the nodes during the computation. In the following, we define
the desirable properties of a distributed computation in a social network, namely scalability and
security, itself encompassing privacy and accuracy.
2.2 Scalability
Scalability means that the computation is able to handle a large number of inputs (i.e., large
values of n): consequently, the properties are expressed in the form of asymptotic bounds.
Definition 2 (
√
-Scalability). A distributed computation is said to be
√
-scalable if the message,
spatial and computational complexities at each node are O(√n · polylog n).
The intuition behind the logarithmic factor in the asymptotic bound is that operations with
the nodes’ identifiers and the memory needed to store such identifiers remain within O(log n).
RR n° 7295
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2.3 Accuracy
The definition of the accuracy of a computation relies on the metric space structure of the output
space U : accuracy is given by the distance between the output of the computation and the actual
value of the output of f . To render it meaningful, we normalize this distance by the diameter of
f(V n) for a distributed computation over n nodes.
Definition 3 (
√
-Accuracy). A distributed computation D is said to √ -accurately compute a S3
candidate (f, U, V, d) if:
1
∆(n)
· max
p non−faulty
d(op, f(v1, . . . , vn)) = O
(
1√
n
)
,
where vi is the input of the i-th node and
∆(n) = max
(x1, . . . , xn)
(y1, . . . , yn)
d(f(x1, . . . , xn), f(y1, . . . , yn)).
This definition highlights the importance of specifying the distance measure of a S3 candidate:
providing the output space with the coarse grain distance d(x, y) = 0 if x = y, and 1 otherwise,
will restrict the class of S3 computations to those that output the exact value of f . Meanwhile, for
binary polling for instance Dpol [8], considering the natural distance on relative numbers includes
computations for which the error on the tally is negligible when compared to the sample size n
(i.e., ∆(n) = 2n).
2.4 Privacy
Privacy characterizes how the information gained by curious nodes taking part in the distributed
computation enables them to recover the input of a particular non-faulty node. Clearly, the cases
where an input can be inferred from only the output and the inputs of the faulty nodes are ignored
when looking at the privacy leaks of a computation. In a perfectly private distributed computation,
a coalition of faulty nodes should be able to recover the input of a non-faulty node if and only if
its input can be inferred from the output of the computation and the inputs of the faulty nodes.
Such configurations of inputs are captured by the notion of trivial inputs. An example of such
configuration of inputs is the case where all non-faulty nodes taking part in a binary poll have the
same input, be it −1 or 1. Since S3 candidates are symmetric by definition, a trivial input is a
configuration where all nodes start with the same input.
Definition 4 (Trivial input). An element v of V ∗ is said to be a trivial input for a coalition B if
there is a node p /∈ B such that for all input configuration v′ that coincides with v for all nodes in
B, f(v) = f(v′) implies vp = v′p.
We say in our context that a distributed computation is private if the probability of recovering
the input of a particular non-faulty node (assuming that it cannot be inferred from the output
alone, i.e., the configuration of inputs is non-trivial) decreases as 1/nα for some positive α. We
capture this notion more formally through the notion of probabilistic anonymity, itself based on
the very notion of message trace.
Definition 5 (Message trace). A message trace (or trace for short) of a distributed computation is
the collection of messages sent in a possible execution of a program. A trace is said to be compatible
with an input configuration v if the trace can be obtained from v with a nonzero probability. We
say that two traces are equivalent with respect to a coalition of faulty nodes B if each node in B
receives the exact same messages in both traces.
We are ready now to introduce the concept of probabilistic anonymity, which encapsulates the
degree of privacy we require.
RR n° 7295
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Definition 6 (Probabilistic anonymity). A distributed computation D is said to be probabilistically
anonymous if for any coalition of faulty nodes B, for any non-faulty node p, and for any trace D
compatible with a non-trivial (w.r.t. B) input configuration v, there exists with high probability a
trace D′ compatible with an input configuration v′ such that (1) D and D′ are equivalent w.r.t. B
and (2) v and v′ differ on the input value of node p.
The intuition behind this definition is that a coalition of faulty nodes cannot distinguish, with
high probability, different executions of a computation in which non-faulty nodes had different
inputs.
Definition 7 (S3 computation). A distributed computation is said to S3-compute a S3 candidate
if it is
√
-scalable,
√
-accurate and probabilistically anonymous with respect to the candidate.
3 Solving S3 for aggregation functions
In this section, we focus on a class of aggregation functions and propose a protocol, namely AG-S3
(S3 for AGgregation), which S3-computes such functions for |B| ≤ √n/ log2 n faulty nodes.
3.1 Assumptions
We consider S3 candidates for which the function f is an aggregation function, i.e. deriving from
an associative binary operation on U : f(v1 . . . , vn) = v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vn. Because a S3 candidate must
be symmetric, the ’⊕’ operation is commutative. This induces a commutative monoid structure
on (U,⊕) and it implies that V is a subset of U . We further assume that the ’⊕’ operation is
compatible with the distance measure d in the sense that
d(v1 ⊕ v2, v′1 ⊕ v′2) ≤ d(v1, v′1) + d(v2, v′2) . (1)
As an example, note that the S3 candidate ((v1, v2, . . . , vn) 7→ v1 + · · · +
vn, {−1,+1},Z, (z1, z2) 7→ |z1 − z2|), introduced in the previous section, satisfies the compat-
ibility condition described above. A simple example of S3 candidate which cannot be ex-
pressed as an aggregation is the one given by the sum of products of pairs of inputs, i.e.
f(x1, . . . , xn) = x1 · x2 + x1 · x3 + x2 · x3 + . . . . This function is symmetric, and choosing U = Z
turns this function into a valid S3 candidate, but it is clearly not an aggregation function.
We assume the size of the set of possible inputs to be constant and the size of the output space
to be polynomial in n implying that any input or output can be represented by O(log n) bits. In
addition, we assume that the diameter ∆(n) of the output space is Ω(n). Due to this assumption,
bit operators do not fall into our definition. Finally, we assume that V is closed with respect to
inverses: if v is in the input set V then 	v is in V as well, where 	v denotes the inverse of v with
respect to the ’⊕’ operation. We denote by δV the diameter of V : δV = maxv,v′∈V d(v, v′).
3.2 Design rationale
The main challenge of S3 computing is the trade-off between scalability and accuracy on the one
hand and privacy on the other hand. We describe below this trade-off and how we address it
before describing the protocol in details.
To ensure scalability, we cluster the nodes into groups of size
√
n, and require that a node sends
messages only to other nodes in a small set of neighboring groups. We introduce two parameters
of the protocol, κ and l. A non-faulty node p is allowed to send messages to any other node in its
own group, and to exactly l nodes in each of κ other groups. For scalability, l and κ need to be low,
since they are directly proportional to message complexity. The same for accuracy: intuitively,
the larger l and κ, the more opportunities a node has to cheat (i.e., corrupt the unique pieces
of information it receives before forwarding them), which entails a higher impact on the output.
To preserve privacy (i.e. probabilistic anonymity), we need a mechanism which, for any node p,
RR n° 7295
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Figure 1: Overview of the overlay
transforms any trace (i.e. input values and messages) into another trace, in such a manner that
all messages received by the coalition of faulty nodes are preserved, and p has a different input in
the two traces. This prevents the coalition from determining the input value of p. It will become
apparent in our proof of privacy that both κ and l need to be large in order to obtain reasonable
privacy requirements. To summarize, accuracy and scalability require the parameters κ and l to
be small, whereas privacy requires them to be large. As a trade-off, we pick them both to be
Θ(log n), which reasonably ensure the S3 requirements.
3.3 Protocol
We describe AG-S3 which computes general aggregation in a S3 manner: the protocol is composed
of two interleaved components: one computes the aggregation function while the other checks the
behavior of users. The pseudo-code of all is given in Algorithms 1-4.
Structure. AG-S3 uses a special structure inspired from [7], where the n nodes are distributed
into groups of size
√
n. Such an overlay can be obtained in a distributed fashion with strong
guarantees on the randomness of nodes placement in the groups even in the presence of malicious
users [10]. The groups (or offices) are placed in a ring, with nodes from a particular group sending
messages to either nodes from the same office (called officemates) or to selected nodes from the
next offices on the ring (called proxies). More specifically, a node is connected to its
√
n officemates
and to l proxies in each of the next κ groups on the ring. If a node p′ is a proxy of p, then p is
said to be a client of p′. The partitioning into groups and their placement on the ring are chosen
uniformly at random. We further assume a perfect client-proxy matching that ensures that a
proxy has exactly κ · l clients. For example, we can index the nodes inside each group and assign
to the i-th node of a group the nodes i + 1, . . . , i + l mod
√
n as proxies in each of the next κ
groups on the ring. We set κ = 3/2 ·blog nc and l = 5 · |V | ·blog nc+1. These choices are motivated
in the next section.
Aggregation. In the first phase, each participant splits its input into κ · l shares in V and sends
them randomly to its assigned proxies. The randomized scheme ensures that the aggregate of the
shares is the input value. The shares are generated as follows: (κ · l − 1)/2 are chosen uniformly
at random, (κ · l−1)/2 are the inverses of the randomly chosen shares, and one is the actual input
of the node.
In the counting phase, each proxy aggregates the shares received in the previous phase to obtain
an individual aggregate. Each node then broadcasts its individual aggregate to all its officemates.
Each node computes the aggregate of the individual aggregates of its officemates and obtains a
local aggregate. If all nodes are non-faulty, then all local aggregates computed in an office are
identical.
In the forwarding phase, the local aggregates are disseminated to other nodes thanks to tokens
forwarded along the ring, as explained below. The forwarding phase is bootstrapped by a special
RR n° 7295
Computing in Social Networks 8
1 procedure share input( v );
2 for i← 1 to (l · κ− 1)/2 do
3 si ←rand V # random values in V ;
4 si+(l·κ−1)/2 ← 	si;
5 sl·κ ← v # the actual input;
6 σ ←rand Sl·κ # random permutation to distribute the shares;
7 for igroup ← 1 to κ do
8 for iproxy ← 1 to l do
9 send (share, pigroup,iproxy , sσ(igroup·l+iproxy));
Algorithm 1: Input sharing
1 upon event receive (share, c, s) do
2 Verify c is a client;
3 Verify s is a valid input in V # s ∈ V ;
4 uind = uind ⊕ s;
Algorithm 2: Individual aggregation
1 procedure local count();
2 foreach officemate o do
3 send (individual agg, o, uind);
Algorithm 3: Local aggregate broadcast
1 upon event receive (individual agg, o, u) do
2 Verify u is a valid aggregate of κ · l shares;
3 # d(u, v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vκ·l) ≤ κ · l · δV where v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vκ·l are random values in V ;
4 ulocal ← ulocal ⊕ u ;
Algorithm 4: Local aggregation
group (that can be determined by the social networking infrastructure at random). The nodes in
this special group send a token containing the local aggregate computed in their group to their
proxies from the next group. The tokens are further forwarded along the ring. The first time a
token reaches a node in a particular group, this node aggregates the local aggregate to the token
and forwards it to its proxies in the next group. When a node receives a token for the second
time, the node sets its own output to the value of the token and forwards it. The third time a
node receives a token, it discards it.
Verifications. The purpose of verifications is to track nodes that deviate from the protocol.
This is achieved by leveraging the value attached by the nodes to their reputation. The basic
mechanism is that misbehaviors are reported by the participants who discover a faulty node and
subsequently tag the latter’s profile. The verifications are performed in each phase of the protocol.
In the sharing phase, each proxy verifies that the shares received are valid input values. In the
second phase, each node checks whether the distance between the individual aggregates sent and
some random valid individual aggregate is at most κ · l · δV . The reason for this is that due to the
compatibility of the distance function with the monoid operation, for any v1, . . . , vk, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
k ∈ V ,
we have that
d(v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vk, v′1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ v′k) ≤ d(v1, v′1) + · · ·+ d(vk, v′k) ≤ k · δV .
The verification in the third phase works as follows: if all the tokens received by a node in a
given round (remember that tokens circulate up to three times around the ring) are not the same,
RR n° 7295
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then an alarm is raised and the profiles of the involved nodes are tagged. Otherwise, the node
broadcasts the unique value of the tokens it received to its officemates. If it is not the case that
all values broadcast are equal, again an alarm is raised.
3.4 Correctness
We prove here that AG-S3 satisfies the S3 conditions for |B| ≤ √n/ log2 n.
Theorem 1 (Scalability). The AG-S3 protocol is
√
-scalable.
Proof. The nodes need to maintain a list of officemates, a list of proxies, and a list of clients. This
amounts to O(√n · log n) space complexity as nodes’ identifiers can be represented using O(log n)
bits. The message complexity is similarly O(√n) arising from the following components: a node
sends κ · l = O(log2 n) shares during the sharing phase, O(√n) copies of its individual aggregate
in the counting phase, and O(√n) in the forwarding phase.
Theorem 2 (Accuracy). The AG-S3 protocol is
√
-accurate.
Proof. A faulty node can bias the output of the computation by either sending an invalid set
of shares, changing the value of its individual aggregate, or corrupt the aggregate during the
forwarding phase. However, a node never misbehaves in a way that this is exposed with certainty
(by the verifications presented in the previous section).
Sharing: Not to be detected, a node must send shares in V . Therefore, the distance between
the sum of a node’s shares and a valid input is at most κ · l · δV .
Counting: Suppose that a faulty node changes its individual aggregate from v = v1⊕· · ·⊕vκ·l
to some value u. When its officemates receive its individual aggregate u they compute the distance
between this aggregate and an arbitrary aggregate w = w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wκ·l. If this distance is larger
than κ · l · δV then the misbehavior is reported. If the distance is within the bound, the triangular
inequality yields an upper-bound on the maximum impact: d(u, v) ≤ d(u,w)+d(w, v) ≤ 2κ · l ·δV .
Forwarding: To corrupt a token without being detected, the coalition of faulty nodes must
fool (i.e., make a node decide and forward a corrupted token without raising an alarm) all the
non-faulty nodes of a group. Otherwise the corruption is detected by the verification consisting in
a node broadcasting the token received to its officemates. To fool a single non-faulty node, all the
l tokens it received from its clients (remember that nodes forward tokens only to their proxies in
the next group) must be equal. Since nodes have l proxies in the next group, f faulty nodes can
fool up to f non-faulty nodes. Assuming that a group contains f non-faulty nodes (and
√
n − f
faulty nodes), then corrupting a token without being detected requires another f faulty nodes in
preceding groups. That is a total of
√
n faulty nodes which cannot happen under the assumption
|B| ≤ √n/ log2 n. To conclude, the local aggregates cannot be corrupted during the forwarding
phase.
The impact of a faulty node on the output of the computation is bounded by 3κ · l ·δv. We have
|B| ≤ √n/ log2 n, κ = O(log n), l = O(log n) and ∆(n) = Ω(n). Putting everything together, we
get that the accuracy of definition 3 is O(√n/ log2 n · log n · log n/n) = O(1/√n), which concludes
the proof.
Theorem 3 (Probabilistic anonymity). The AG-S3 protocol is probabilistically anonymous.
Proof. We need to show that, with high probability, there exists a mechanism that for any node p,
transforms any trace in such a way that the coalition of faulty nodes receives the same messages,
but p has a different input. We first give an outline of the proof.
The transformation mechanism consists of changing the values transmitted between non-faulty
nodes, in such a way that any subsequent message sent by non-faulty nodes to the nodes in the
coalition does not change. As a result, the coalition receives the same information. The basic
idea of this mechanism is to swap the inputs of two nodes p1 and p2, provided that there is a
non-compromised group g (a group with no faulty nodes) that contains proxies of both p1 and p2.
In this case, we can modify the shares sent by p1 and p2 to proxies in g, in such a way that the
RR n° 7295
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local aggregate of g is maintained. Since we assume that all nodes in g are non-faulty, the coalition
does not have access to information exchanged in g during the counting phase. The coalition only
sees what the nodes in g decide to broadcast in the forwarding phase, but that is identical to what
is sent in the original trace. To modify the shares of p1 and p2, we assume that both send a share
containing their own input to some proxies in g. Each of p1 and p2 has l proxies in g, so the larger
l is, the larger the probability that our assumption is true. Then the aforementioned shares of p1
and p2 are swapped, resulting a consistent trace, where p1 and p2 swapped input values.
In case there is no such common non-compromised group g for p1 and p2, we may still find
a chain of nodes with endpoints p1 and p2, such that two consecutive nodes in the chain can
swap input values. The larger κ, the larger the probability that such a chain exists. Afterwards,
the nodes can swap shares along the chain, resulting in a consistent configuration where p1 has
as input the old input value of p2. The rest of the proof is concerned with making our outline
description precise.
Let D be a trace of AG-S3 compatible with a non-trivial input v, B be a coalition of faulty
nodes (|B| ≤ √n/ log2 n) and p be a non-faulty node. Since the input is non-trivial, there exists a
node p′ whose input is different from the input of p in v, and we prove that with high probability
there exists a trace equivalent to D compatible with an input configuration v′ which is the same
as v, except that the inputs of p and p′ have been swapped.
We say that a group compromised if it contains at least one faulty node. The coalition of faulty
nodes knows the local aggregates of all the groups, the individual aggregates of the proxies in the
compromised groups, the shares they received and their own inputs.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The probability that in any sequence of κ− 1 consecutive groups there is at least one
non-compromised group, is at least 1−√n
(
|B|√
n
)κ−1
.
Proof. This probability is minimized if no two faulty nodes lie in the same group, i.e. there are
|B| compromised groups. Fix κ − 1 consecutive groups. The number of configurations in which
these groups are compromised is
(√
n−κ+1
|B|−κ+1
)
. The total number of configurations is
(√
n
|B|
)
, so the
probability that all the fixed k consecutive groups are compromised is given by the ratio of the two
binomial coefficients, which is upper-bounded by (|B|/√n)κ−1. We use the union bound to upper-
bound the probability that there is at least one such sequence of κ− 1 consecutive compromised
groups. There are
√
n sequences of κ− 1 consecutive groups, which proves the lemma.
Since κ = 3/2·blog nc and |B| ≤ √n/ log2 n, we get that the probability of having κ consecutive
compromised groups is at most 1/n.
Lemma 2. Given x ∈ V , the probability that a node sends at least one share of value x to a proxy
situated in a given group, assuming this node has proxies in that group, is at least 1− 1/n3.
Proof. The l shares sent to a group by a node are randomly picked from a set of κ · l shares in
which (κ · l − 1)/2 are random, (κ · l − 1)/2 are the inverses of the random shares, and one is the
actual input of the node. At least (l − 1)/2 of them are independent, and drawn uniformly at
random from V . Thus, the probability that a is not one of them is at most (1− 1/|V |)(l−1)/2.
Since (l− 1)/2 = 5/2 · |V | · blog nc, this probability is upper-bounded by 1/n5/2, which proves the
lemma.
Let g(·) denote the index of a group in which a node lies. Without loss of generality, we assume
that g(p) = 0. Since we assume that the input v is not trivial, let p′ be a node such that its input
v′p is different from the input of p, i.e., vp. Let i1, . . . , iM be a sequence of indexes such that: (1)
group gim is non-compromised for all m, (2) 0 < i1 < κ, (3) 0 < im+1 − im < κ for all m, and (4)
0 < iM − g(p′) < κ. Such a sequence exists with high probability according to Lemma 1. For all
1 ≤ m < M , we define pm as an arbitrary non-faulty node in group gim−1. Additionally, we set
p0 = p and pM = p
′. Since all nodes have proxies in the κ groups succeeding them, we have that
for all 1 ≤ m ≤M , pm−1 and pm both have proxies in gim as depicted in Figure 2.
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Using Lemma 2 and using an union bound on the 1 ≤ m ≤ M , we get that the probability
that for all 1 ≤ m ≤M , pm−1 sends a share of value vp to a proxy in gm and pm sends a share of
value vp to a proxy in gm, is at least 1− 2M/n5/2. Since M is bounded by the number of groups,
namely
√
n, this probability is lower-bounded by 1− 2/n2.
Assuming that this event occurs, we exhibit a trace compatible with a configuration of inputs
where the inputs of p and p′ are swapped: for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M , the vp share sent by pm−1 to gim
is replaced by v′p and the v
′
p share sent by pm to gim is replaced by vp, as illustrated in Figure 2.
This trace is equivalent to D with respect to the coalition B as no share sent to a compromised
group is changed and all local aggregates remain the same.
We complete the proof by showing that this trace is indeed compatible with the modified
configuration of inputs. In the case of AG-S3, compatible means that the set of shares sent by
a node is composed of (κ · l − 1)/2 values of V , their inverses, and the actual input of the node.
For p and p′, we only change the value of one share equal to their inputs. Therefore, their set of
shares remains compatible with their new inputs. For the other nodes pm, 0 < m < M , two of
their shares are simply swapped.
We proved that the privacy of a given non-faulty node p is preserved with probability at least
1 − 2/n2, given that the event of Lemma 1 occurs. Since the probability of this event is large
(according to Lemma 1), using Bayes rule it is clear that 1 − 3/n2 is an upper bound on the
probability that privacy of a particular node is preserved. Using a union bound over the whole
set of at most n non-faulty node nodes, we obtain that probabilistic anonymity as defined in
Definition 6 is preserved with probability 1− 2/n.
p
g(p) = 0
vp
. . . p1
gi1−1
v′p
gi1
vp
. . . p2
gi2−1
v′p
gi2
. . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ κ + 1 groups
. . . pM−1
giM−1−1
v′p
giM−1
vp
. . . p′
g(p′)
v′p
. . .
giM
(a) Initial configuration
p
g(p) = 0
v′p
. . . p1
gi1−1
vp
gi1
v′p
. . . p2
gi2−1
vp
gi2
. . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ κ + 1 groups
. . . pM−1
giM−1−1
vp
giM−1
v′p
. . . p′
g(p′)
vp
. . .
giM
(b) Swapped configuration
Figure 2: Illustration of the proof of privacy: pairs of shares sent in the same group can be swapped
((a) → (b)) leading to an equivalent trace compatible with a different configuration of inputs.
4 Generalization
In this section, we show that any Lipschitz continuous S3 candidate can be S3-computed for
|B| ≤ √n/ log2 n faulty nodes provided that the input set is V finite.
Definition 8 (Lipschitz continuity). A function f : A → B is said to be Lipschitz continuous if
for some distances on A and B, and for any two input values x and y the ratio of the distance
between f(x) and f(y) and the distance between x and y is bounded by a constant factor. That is,
there exists a constant number k such that for all x, y in A:
dB(f(x), f(y))
dA(x, y)
< k .
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Consider now a S3 candidate (f, V, U, d) as defined in Section 2. Since f is symmetric, it can
be thought of as a function that maps a multi-set of input values in V to a value in U . Since V is
of finite size, a possible representation of such multi-sets is to use vector of |V | integers where the
i-th component represents the number of times vi appears in the multi-set. A natural distance dms
over the set of such multi-sets is the L1 norm of the difference of the vectors representing the multi-
sets. For instance, if V = {v1, v2}, the multi-sets S1 = {v1, v1} and S2 = {v1, v2} are respectively
represented by the vectors (2, 0) and (1, 1) and dms(S1, S2) = ‖(2, 0)− (1, 1)‖1 = ‖(1,−1)‖1 =
|1|+ | − 1| = 2. This being said, we can now define a Lipschitz continuous S3 candidate:
Definition 9 (Lipschitz continuous S3 candidate). A S3 candidate (f, V, U, d) is said to be Lips-
chitz continuous if f is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the distances dms and d.
We are now ready to state and prove the theorem.
Theorem 4. Any Lipschitz continuous S3 candidate (f, V, U, d) with a finite size input set can be
S3-computed for |B| ≤ √n/ log2 n.
Proof. We start the proof by showing that AG-S3 can S3-compute the multi-set of inputs using
the aforementioned representation. This follows directly from the result presented in the previous
section.
Consider the set of multi-sets of values in V of size at most n · κ · l. Such multi-sets can be
represented by an element of A = {−n·κ·l, . . . , n·κ·l}|V | (the reason why we need negative numbers
is explained below). Let B be the subset of A containing vectors of |V | integers such that only
one component is in {−1, 1} and all the other components are null. Let +∗ the component-wise
addition of vectors of A. Note that +∗ computes the union of the multi-sets. The +∗ operation
can be turned into an internal operation over A by forcing the components of the sum of vectors
of A to be at most n · κ · l (if a component of the sum is greater than n · κ · l resp. lower than
−n · κ · l, its value if forced to n · κ · l resp. −n · κ · l). However, this situation never occurs with
AG-S3 since each node receives κ · l input values and thus the components of the aggregates are
always smaller than n · κ · l.
It can be seen that (+∗, B,A, ‖.− .‖1) is a S3 candidate, B is of finite size and closed with
respect to inverses, the size of A is smaller than a polynomial in n (|A| = (2 · n · κ · l + 1)|V |,
with κ = 3/2 · blog nc and l = 5 · |V | · blog nc + 1) and its diameter is 2 · |V | · n = Ω(n), and +∗
derives from a binary monoid operation (i.e., component-wise vector addition) and is compatible
with ‖.− .‖1. All the conditions are therefore met to S3-compute a vector representation of the
multi-set of inputs using AG-S3.
After a node computes the vector representation of the multi-set of inputs, it can compute the
output by applying f to the corresponding multi-set. More specifically, if a node computes the
vector (3, 2, 1) using AG-S3, it outputs f(v1, v1, v1, v2, v2, v3). Since the computation is achieved
using AG-S3, privacy and scalability hold. Regarding accuracy, putting together the fact that the
multi-set of inputs is computed accurately by AG-S3 and the fact that f is Lipschitz continuous
proves that the computation of f is accurate.
If the vector computed contains negative values (which can happen in the presence of faulty
nodes), they are replaced with zeros. Note that since the actual value of the computation cannot
contain negative numbers, replacing negative numbers by 0 decreases the distance between the
output and the ideal result and thus does not jeopardize accuracy.
5 Related work
Cryptographic primitives and secure multi-party computation [3,12,16] allow to compute aggrega-
tion functions in a secure way. This comes however at the price of non-scalability. Assuming trust
relationships between users of a social network, Vu et al. [15] proposed an improved secret sharing
scheme to protect privacy. In that scheme, the actual relationships between nodes are used to
determine the trustworthy participants, and the shares are only distributed to those. In contrast,
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AG-S3 exploits solely the human nature of social networks without making any assumptions on
the social relationships themselves.
The population protocol model of et al. [1] provides a theoretical framework of mobile devices
with limited memory, which relates to the scalability requirement of the S3 problem. The model
however can only compute first order formulas in Presburger arithmetic [2] and can tolerate only
a constant number of benign failures [4]. The community protocol model [9] relax the scalability
requirements on the memory sizes of tiny agents which enables powerful computations and Byzan-
tine fault-tolerance. Yet, the model breaks anonymity as agents are assigned unique ids. This
illustrates the trade-off between the power and security of a model on one hand and privacy on the
other hand. The problem of privacy in population protocols was also tackled in [5]. The sharing
scheme of AG-S3 is inspired by the obfuscation mechanism proposed in that paper, namely adding
unit noise (+1 or -1) to their inputs, upon a state exchange. Dpol [8], itself also inspired by [5],
can be be viewed as a restricted form of AG-S3. Dpol is restricted to binary polling: it aggregates
values in {−1,+1} and it uses a rudimentary secret sharing scheme and overly structure that
assume (i) a uniform distribution of inputs, and (ii) a built-in anonymous overlay: these are the
two main difficulties of the privacy challenge as defined in the S3 problem.
Differential privacy [6] and k-anonymity [14] are two common ways to express privacy in the
context of distributed computations on sensitive databases. Contrary to AG-S3, where faulty
nodes take part in the computation, those techniques aim at protecting the privacy of inputs from
an external attacker that queries the database. Differential privacy characterizes the amount of
information disclosed by the output by bounding the impact of a single input on the output. It
is typically achieved by adding noise to the output. However, as pointed out in [13], differential
privacy does not capture the cases of rare input configurations due to the multiplicative bounds
in its formulation, which is precisely the difficult case we need to address in the S3 problem,
i.e., the case where everybody but one node have the same inputs. The obfuscating technique
consisting in adding noise to intermediate results cannot be used in the context of S3 computing.
The granularity of noise may indeed by high if elements of V are far away. In addition, it gives
more opportunities to faulty nodes to bias the output of the computation. On the other hand,
k-anonymity guarantees that any input value maps to at least k input nodes. In the S3 problem,
privacy can be seen as 2-anonymity with high probability, expressed in a distributed setting. With
AG-S3, faulty nodes cannot map any input to a restricted subset of nodes as any two nonfaulty
nodes can swap their inputs transparently. It thus ensures n−B-anonymity with high probability.
6 Conclusion
Social networks constitute now huge platforms on which it is very tempting to perform large scale
computations. Yet, such computations are challenging as one needs to ensure privacy, scalability
and accuracy. We leverage the very fact that, in such platforms, behind every node lies a re-
spectable user who cares about his reputation, in order to make the problem tractable. We define
what the notion of computation means in that context and propose a protocol that computes a
class of aggregation functions. This is a first step toward understanding what can be computed
in a social network and many open questions are left open such as what is the maximum number
of faulty nodes a S3 protocol can tolerate and what else besides aggregation functions can be
computed in a S3 manner?
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